IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

Date: 20130611

Docket: 18222

Registry:
Cranbrook

Between:

Douglas Lloyd
Woods
Olive Marie Steinwandt
Doris Kathleen Bernard
Norma Elizabeth Janzen
John David Lawrence Woods
Peter Woods

Plaintiffs

And

Peter Moody –
Administrator of the Estate of
Ola Mae Woods, the Estate of Ola Mae Woods
and Carmen Naomi Woods

Defendants

Before:
The Honourable Madam Justice Fenlon

Reasons for Judgment

INTRODUCTION

[1]            
The plaintiffs seek to set aside a testamentary gift made by their
mother, Ola May Woods, to her granddaughter, the defendant Carmen Naomi Woods. The
plaintiffs argue that the will was made in suspicious circumstances and that
the gift was the result of undue influence or duress.

BACKGROUND

[2]            
Ola May and her husband John had seven children, including the six plaintiffs: 
Peter Woods, David Woods, Norma Janzen, Doris Bernard, Olive Steinwandt and
Douglas Woods. They range in age from 65 to 79. The seventh, Harold Woods, predeceased
his mother. He was the father of Carmen, who is 44 years old.

[3]            
I will refer to the testatrix and parties by first name in order to
avoid confusion. I mean no disrespect in so doing.

[4]            
Ola May and John raised their family on a farm near Kimberley, British
Columbia. It was not an easy life. The children, especially the older sons,
Peter, David and Harold, were expected to work alongside their father — and
work they did. There was no running water, electricity or money for extras.

[5]            
When the children finished school they moved away from the farm to start
their own families. As adults, they remained close to their parents, visiting
and helping out when they could. The sons helped with the general maintenance
of the farm, fixing fences and roofs. Peter routinely made sure his parents had
enough wood for the winter. As Ola May and John did not have a vehicle, those
children who lived nearby helped with rides into town. All of the children helped
get electricity out to the farm, each contributing to the installation of the
poles necessary to carry the electrical lines as well as the wiring of the house.
When John seriously injured his arm and had to go to the hospital in Vancouver,
Peter milked the cows and did other chores on top of his own farm work. In
1975, the plaintiffs paid to install plumbing in the house. Up until that point
in time, the house only had a stand pipe in the kitchen from the well. David, Douglas
and a neighbour put in a septic field and a hot water tank. They also installed
a sink and tub on the back porch.

[6]            
In 1960, John and Ola May fell behind in their taxes and other bills. Without
telling Ola May or his other children, John sold part of the farm to Peter so
that John could pay off the debts and hold onto the rest of the farm. The sale
to Peter left a larger lot (Lot A) and a smaller lot (Lot B).

[7]            
In 1976, Ola May and John’s children were in their late 20s to early 40s.
The couple made up identical wills, leaving everything to each other; if the
other predeceased, Lots A and B were to go to their youngest child, Douglas. If
Douglas predeceased his parents, the farm was to go to the Pines Extended Care
Home in Kimberley. The wills also made a number of specific bequests of
personal property to various family members.

[8]            
A copy of this will was entered into evidence. It was unsigned, but professionally
prepared. The plaintiffs do not seek to prove the earlier will since they do
not rely on it even if the will in issue in these proceedings is found to be in
part unenforceable. I find that it is probable this unsigned will is a copy of
a will made and formalized in 1976 expressing the intentions of Ola May and
John at that time.

[9]            
Two years later, on October 31, 1978, Ola May and John made new wills. The
new wills generally followed the same pattern as the earlier wills but instead
of leaving both farm lots to Douglas, Lot A was left to their son Harold for
life, with a gift over to his daughter Carmen. As in the earlier will, Lot B
was given to Douglas and if he predeceased his parents, Lot B was to go to the
Pines Extended Care Home.

[10]        
I note that John’s will was not entered into evidence but it was common
ground between the parties that John and Ola May made identical wills.

[11]        
John died in 1981. Ola May carried on living at the farm and the adult children
continued to visit and provide her with assistance. Ola May kept a daily diary
from February 1979 until April 1990. The diary is full of the small details of her
life, such as the weather, vegetables she had put up from the garden, hockey
scores and visits from family and friends. In 1990, Ola May suffered a series
of strokes that made it necessary for her to move into the Pines Extended Care
Home.

[12]        
Harold died in Mexico on January 9, 2003. Ola May died on April 8, 2004.
Probate of her will was granted on September 27, 2004. There was great
consternation among the plaintiffs over the gift of the larger portion of the
farm to Carmen. At the time, Lot A was valued at $201,000 and Lot B, the lot
given to Douglas, at $70,000. In February 2008, the plaintiffs commenced this
action to set aside the gift of Lot A to Carmen.

[13]        
This case involves events which transpired in 1978. The evidence of what
took place is more comprehensive than would be expected. Harold had a habit of
writing lengthy letters (one over 60 pages) to set down his views on what had
transpired over the past 20 to 30 years. Ola May faithfully kept her diary up
until the deterioration of her health in 1990. All of the parties preserved
letters written by other family members. As a result, there is an extensive and
relatively contemporaneous record of events as seen from the eyes of the
testatrix and of the deceased beneficiary who is alleged to have subjected the
testatrix to undue influence or duress.

ISSUE

[14]        
The only issue in this proceeding is whether the gift of Lot A to Carmen
was made in suspicious circumstances and as a result of undue influence or
duress.

[15]        
The plaintiffs did not commence an action under the Wills Variation
Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 490.

ANALYSIS

Burden of Proof

[16]        
The plaintiffs plead suspicious circumstances and undue influence. These
allegations both raise the issue of whether Ola May’s will reflects her real
and voluntary intentions.

[17]        
The leading case in this area is Vout v. Hay, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 876.
In that decision, Sopinka J., writing for the Court, noted that while
there is some overlap between the concepts of suspicious circumstance and undue
influence, they are nonetheless distinct grounds for setting aside a
testamentary disposition. Where suspicious circumstances are alleged, the
propounder of the will has the legal burden of proving the testator’s knowledge
and approval of its contents. Where undue influence is alleged, the person attacking
the will has the burden of proof (para. 28). The distinction between the
two allegations is further explained at para. 29:

It may be thought that proof of knowledge and approval will
go a long way in disproving undue influence. Unquestionably there is an
overlap. If it is established that the testator knew and appreciated what he
was doing, in many cases there is little room for a finding that the testator
was coerced. Nonetheless there is a distinction. This distinction was aptly
expressed by Ritchie J. in Re Martin. At pages 765-66, he stated:

There is a distinction to be borne in mind between producing
sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that a suspicion raised by the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the will have been dispelled and
producing the evidence necessary to establish an allegation of undue influence.
The former task lies upon the proponents of the will, the latter is a burden
assumed by those who are attacking the will and can only be discharged by proof
of the existence of an influence acting upon the mind of the testator of the
kind described by Viscount Haldane in Craig v. Lamoureux [[1920] A.C.
349], at p. 357 …

[18]        
I note parenthetically that the new Wills, Estates and Succession Act,
S.B.C. 2009, c. 13, passed by order of the Lieutenant Governor in Council
on March 27, 2013 (B.C. Reg. 148/2013) but not yet proclaimed, is to come into
effect on March 31, 2014. It will shift the burden of disproving undue
influence to the propounder of the will.

Was the will made in suspicious circumstances?

[19]        
In Vout, Sopinka J. explained the meaning of “suspicious circumstances”
at para. 25:

…suspicious circumstances may be
raised by (1) circumstances surrounding the preparation of the will, (2)
circumstances tending to call into question the capacity of the testator, or
(3) circumstances tending to show that the free will of the testator was
overborne by acts of coercion or fraud.

[20]        
The plaintiffs submit the circumstances surrounding the making of their
mother’s will in 1978 were highly suspicious. They rely on the following
evidence.

[21]        
First, Harold wrote to his brother David in May 1992 after David had
been appointed Ola May’s Committee. Harold informed David that he had asked his
parents to change their wills. He said that he discovered when home visiting
that they intended to leave the farm to the Pines Extended Care Home. In his
letter, Harold asserted that he convinced them to leave Lot A to him and then
to Carmen and to give Lot B to Douglas, whom he regarded as too young in 1962
to have been part of the “treachery” he considered had led to Peter secretly
purchasing part of the farm. (Harold was mistaken about the earlier will
leaving the entire farm to the Pines Extended Care Home, since in fact it left
the property to Douglas and only to the Pines Extended Care Home if Douglas
predeceased both parents.)

[22]        
Second, in the same letter, Harold stated that he paid for the changes
to his parents’ wills and was present at the lawyer’s office when the wills
were made.

[23]        
While in common parlance these facts could be described as “suspicious
circumstances”, the legal requirement is more stringent. As Wilson J.
stated in Watson v. Watson and Yelich, 2004 BCSC 1724 at para. 64:

It is not sufficient that
circumstances create a general miasma of suspicion that something unsavoury may
have occurred. Rather the circumstances must be such as to create a specific
and focussed suspicion that the testator may not have known and approved of the
contents of the will.

[24]        
I conclude for the following reasons that Ola May knew and approved the
contents of the will she executed on October 31, 1978.

[25]        
First, it is common ground between the parties that Ola May had the
mental capacity to make a will. She was 70 at the time, younger than most of
the plaintiffs at trial.

[26]        
Further, the two lawyers practicing at the firm responsible for making
the will in 1978 testified at trial. William Heflin was a young associate. He
could not recall making the will. He believed he did not draw it because his practice
was not to include specific bequests within the will. Rather, he would attach
them as a schedule. It was also Mr. Heflin’s practice to see the testator
alone and to request that the person accompanying the testator leave his office
for that purpose.

[27]        
Robert Apps was the senior lawyer at the firm in 1978. Based on the
references to Mr. Apps in both Harold’s letters and his mother’s diaries,
I find that it is likely that he was the lawyer who oversaw the execution of
the will. Mr. Apps cannot recall the circumstances surrounding the making
of Ola May’s will, although his records show that he took instructions. The
will was witnessed by his staff and Mr. Apps is of the view that he was
not present when the will was actually signed. He testified that it was his
practice if family members wished to be present to permit them to be there when
he was taking instructions. He would then speak to the testator alone to
confirm that the instructions accorded with the testator’s wishes. Mr. Apps
said he would not take instructions if he was aware of any suspicious
circumstances or coercion.

[28]        
Based on the evidence of Mr. Apps and Mr. Heflin, I find that
the will was explained to Ola May in the absence of Harold and that she
understood and intended the dispositions it contained.

[29]        
This finding is also supported by the nature of the mutual wills made by
Ola May and her husband John, who was 74 at the time. John too left Lot A to
Harold for life with a gift over to Carmen and Lot B to Douglas. By all
accounts, John was a demanding father and someone who was difficult to please. It
seems unlikely that John and Ola May would both not intend the effect of the
wills they were signing.

[30]        
In conclusion on this issue, the propounder of the will has proved that
Ola May had knowledge of and intended the testamentary dispositions contained
in her will.

Did the testatrix make the gift to the defendant
due to duress or undue influence?

[31]        
The burden of proof for undue influence was summarized by Madam Justice Gray
in Maddess v. Racz, 2008 BCSC 1550 (aff’d 2009 BCCA 539, leave to appeal
ref’d [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 72) at para. 324:

In order to prove undue influence
it must be shown that the influence exerted against the testator amounted to
coercion: see Wingrove v. Wingrove (1885), 11 P.D. 81, at 82. The influence
exerted must be so great that the will reflects, not the wishes of the
testator, but of the person influencing. However, attempts to influence the
testator will not amount to undue influence provided the testator remains able
to act freely. Nor is it sufficient to show that the party benefiting under the
will was merely in the position to coerce the testator: the coercive power must
actually have been exercised: Re Sweed Estate, [1988] N.B.J. No. 1045,
91 N.B.R. (2d) 416 (C.A.), citing Baudains v. Richardson, [1906] A.C.
169 at 185.

[32]        
The parties used “duress” and “undue influence” interchangeably in
argument. In my view, duress is distinguishable from undue influence because
the former involves a degree of physical compulsion or threat that is not inherent
in undue influence. In Saxon v. Saxon, [1976] 4 W.W.R. 300 (B.C.S.C.) (aff’d
[1978] 4 W.W.R. 327 (B.C.C.A.)) at 305 – 307, Spencer J. addressed this
distinction:

The law
draws a distinction between duress and undue influence. Duress in the execution
of a contract or deed occurs when there is a physical compulsion of the person,
which must be very rare, or when there is a threat to the person’s life or
limb, or a threat of a physical beating (mayhem) or of imprisonment (see Piper
v. Harris Manufacturing Co., supra). It may also take into account
threats of a wrongful imprisonment or prosecution of the person (see Armstrong
v. Gage, supra) and possibly of the person’s near relative as in Williams
v. Bailey (1866), H.L. 1 E. & I. App. 200. In the latter case
only Lord Westbury categorized the behaviour of the bank in exacting a
promissory note from the plaintiff as "undue pressure". Lord
Chelmsford categorized it as an example of "undue influence" and
Cranworth L.C. rested his judgment solely upon the ground that the promissory
note was unenforceable because it was given to stifle a prosecution. Lord
Westbury’s expression "undue pressure" seems to bridge the two
positions of undue influence and duress.

In contrast to duress, undue
influence may exist without violence or threats of violence against the victim.
It depends upon the existence of a relationship between two parties which,
while it continues, causes one to place a confidence in the other, which
produces a natural influence over the one which that other abuses to his own
advantage. See Krys v. Krys, [1929] S.C.R. 153 at
162, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 289, where Newcombe J. quotes from Tate
v. Williamson (1866), 2 Ch. App. 55. The relationship is to be
founded upon the facts of the case.

[33]        
The analysis in the case before me properly proceeds under the
claim of undue influence. There is no evidence that Harold threatened his
mother or used physical compulsion. Have the plaintiffs proved undue influence?

[34]        
The plaintiffs submit that their mother was afraid of Harold and gave in
to his obsessive demands that the farm be left to him because she felt she had
no choice. In support of that submission, the plaintiffs rely on the following
evidence.

[35]        
First, they submit that Harold had an opportunity to influence their
mother because he lived with his parents and then with his mother regularly
from 1962 until she left the farm to go into care in 1990. Second, they rely on
a statement Ola May is alleged to have made about the will to one of her other
children to the effect that she “had no choice”.

[36]        
I conclude that the plaintiffs have not proved Harold exercised
sufficient undue influence upon Ola May to amount to coercion for the following
reasons. The statement “I had no choice” could express nothing more than a
feeling of obligation to distribute part of the estate to Harold in view of his
efforts on the farm when he returned from time to time. Further, the only
evidence about the alleged statement came from Norma, who testified that her brother
Douglas told her that their mother had said that to him. Norma could not recall
when she heard Douglas make this statement. Douglas testified at trial and
candidly stated that he did not recall making such a statement. All he could
say was that if Norma says he made the statement, then he probably did. Norma’s
evidence about the statement is double hearsay and therefore unreliable.

[37]        
Third, the plaintiffs point to the 25-month gap between the making of
the 1976 will and the revisions resulting in the 1978 will. They argue that the
sudden change in the contents of the will suggests that Harold must have influenced
his mother to make a new will. While I accept that Harold influenced both
parents by asking them to change their wills, the law is well-settled that influence
is not equivalent to coercion. Harold may well have persuaded his parents that
he and Carmen deserved the farm, either because he had contributed to it and
promised to help them stay on the farm or because, unlike his siblings, Harold
was not settled and wanted to return to the farm to live there eventually. As
long as Ola May acceded to Harold’s suggestions of her own free will, coercion
is not made out. Something more is required, as noted in Bates v. Finley,
2002 BCSC 159 at para. 115:

In order to render a will void,
undue influence must be an influence which can justly be described by a person
looking at the matter judicially as having caused the execution of a paper
which pretends to express the testator’s mind, but which really does not, and
expresses something else which he did not really mean: Craig v. Lamoureux,
[1920] A.C. 349 (P.C.) and MacGregor v. Martin Estate, [1965]
S.C.R. 757.

[38]        
Fourth, the plaintiffs argue that the change between the 1976 and 1978
wills is “night and day”, which arguably calls into question the voluntariness
of the second will. I do not accept this characterization of the two wills. They
are in fact strikingly similar. In both wills, Ola May left everything to her
husband John. In the first will, if he predeceased her, she gave the farm to
her son Douglas. In the event of Douglas’ death preceding hers, the farm was to
go to the Pines Extended Care Home. She then made a number of specific bequests,
such as dishes and linens to various members of the family. In the second will,
in the event of her husband’s earlier demise, Ola May left part of the farm to
her son Douglas, with that gift going to the Pines Extended Care Home should he
predecease her. She left the other part of the farm to another son, Harold, for
life and then to her granddaughter Carmen. Once again, the second will
contained a number of specific bequests to various family members. Neither will
distributed the farm among all of the children. In both wills, one or two
children are singled out to receive the farm, which represented the bulk of Ola
May’s estate.

[39]        
Fifth, the plaintiffs rely on various diary entries made by their mother
about Harold, which suggest that she was afraid of him. These entries include
references to “peace descending” when Harold left and comments that it was
“nice to be alone” following his departure. Ola May also made reference to
feeling as though she was being spied on, comments that generally related to
the presence of an older gentleman named Bill who, it appears, had been asked
to stay at the farm by Harold in order to keep an eye on things and prevent his
brothers from removing what he considered to be his property from the farm.

[40]        
All the diary entries were made after the will was executed in 1978. In
addition, the diaries contain negative or similar comments about other family
members. Further, there are many positive entries about Harold, a sampling of
which follow:

[41]        
The plaintiffs also rely on their observations from time to time that
their mother appeared nervous around Harold and fearful of him. Olive described
watching television with her mother who, while knitting or tatting,
continuously watched Harold out of the corner of her eye. Peter described
coming to plow the front yard in the winter and his mother being close to tears
telling him to stop so that he would not disturb the gravel that Harold had
placed in the front yard the previous summer.

[42]        
Much of the plaintiffs’ evidence went to Harold’s difficult character
and the tension that he created in the family. It is apparent from reading
Harold’s letters and from the descriptions of his behaviour given by the
plaintiffs and his daughter and his former wife, Maureen Campsall, who
testified on behalf of her daughter in the proceeding, that Harold was a
difficult man. Maureen said Harold was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. She
described him as being unpredictable and prone to violence; he assaulted her on
three occasions.

[43]        
Harold’s letters show that he was focused on the farm and convinced that
he had contributed a great deal to maintaining it and helping his parents stay
on the land. Harold’s writing shows that he was obsessed with getting his share
of the farm, which he considered to be his “birthright”. This obsession
escalated into displays of  bad temper. A number of witnesses described an
incident in 1962 when Harold returned from his stint in the navy to discover
that Peter had purchased a large portion of the farm from their father. Harold
grabbed his rifle and was heading out to find Peter when Ola May stopped him and
convinced him not to confront his brother. It was commonly thought that Harold was
so angry he would otherwise have killed Peter that day.

[44]        
Douglas also described Harold as changed when he was medically
discharged from the navy. Douglas was 12 years old at the time and Harold would
make him stand in the sun at attention for long periods of time as punishment.

[45]        
I find that Harold had a difficult temperament and that other members of
the family tended to tiptoe around him for fear of his unpredictable temper. Ola
May’s diary entries suggest that she was on edge at times around Harold. But
the diary entries taken as a whole indicate that Ola May was fond of Harold and
that she genuinely enjoyed his company. I find it likely that Ola May wanted to
keep the peace by appeasing Harold but I do not find that the evidence supports
Harold having the kind of influence over Ola May that would cause her to
execute a will in 1978 that did not express her wishes. I come to that
conclusion for the following reasons in addition to those noted above in
response to each of the submissions made by the plaintiffs.

[46]        
First, in 1978, when the will was made, Ola May’s children, other than
Harold, were settled in stable marriages. Harold and Maureen had separated in
1972 and were divorced in 1976. The plaintiffs described Harold moving from job
to job, returning home at regular intervals to live on the farm. All of that
would have been known to Ola May. Her decision to leave Harold a life estate in
the farm given that he was using it as his “home base” and did not have a
settled home is not surprising.

[47]        
Second, even if Harold was exerting some influence on his mother at the
time the will was executed, he often worked out of town for extended periods of
time, giving her and her husband ample time to change their wills.

[48]        
Third, and most significantly, after her husband died in May 1981, Ola May
attended at the office of Mr. Apps on August 10, 1981 to review her will. Her
diary entry for that day records going to Kimberley with Douglas and his wife
Colleen to see Mr. Apps. She wrote, in reference to that visit to Mr. Apps:
“he says the will okay”. It is significant that Douglas and his wife took Ola May
to her lawyer’s office. At the time, Harold was working out of town for an
extended period in Sandspit. If Ola May wanted to change her will, she had ample
opportunity to do so and did not.

[49]        
The plaintiffs argue that Ola May was afraid to change her will even
though Harold was not in town because he would demand to know what the will
stated when he returned. I do not find that argument persuasive because Harold
would have no reason to suspect his mother had changed the will. Even if he
did, Douglas and Peter gave evidence that their mother was secretive about her
will; all of the plaintiffs, other than Douglas, agreed that she had never
discussed her will with them.

[50]        
Fourth, the 1978 will left only a life estate to Harold. If the gift
reflected undue influence and Harold’s wishes, I find it probable that Ola May
would have made an outright gift of Lot A to Harold. That was certainly his recorded
view of how he thought things should be.

[51]        
Fifth, the gift over to the defendant Carmen, who was only nine years
old at the time the will was drawn, is consistent with the evidence of both
Maureen and the defendant that Ola May had a special place in her heart for her
granddaughter Carmen. While the plaintiffs argued that their mother was close
to all of her grandchildren, and I accept that to be so, it does appear that Ola
May took a special interest in Carmen. The form of will prepared in 1976, when
Carmen was seven years old, singled Carmen out as the only granddaughter to
receive a specific bequest: two antique Chinese vases. The other specific
bequests were to her daughters, daughters-in-law and sons. The 1978 will, in
addition to leaving Carmen Lot A, repeated the gift of the two vases to her in
the list of specific bequests.

[52]        
Sixth, in the 1978 will, Ola May changed one of the specific bequests,
giving her tatted centrepiece to her daughter-in-law Dorothy rather than to her
daughter-in-law Leta. This suggests that the changes to the will in 1978 were
more comprehensive than simply making sure that Harold received Lot A due to
his undue influence.

[53]        
The plaintiffs made much of a letter written by Carmen to her
grandmother in September 1988, when Carmen was 18 years old. In the letter she
describes being very disturbed about the fact that her father’s “attitude about
the farm has surfaced”. She described her father thinking about it as his farm
and then asks:

Grandma, how do you feel about
his presumed takeover of the farm? I know that you feel pressured to give in to
him, basically he isn’t giving you much choice, but who do you think this whole
procedure is helping?

She continued later in the
letter:

I can’t stress enough the
importance of your keeping your eyes open for this kind of activity. Dad is
eventually going to break the bonds of the family to the farm and relocate you.
He has the family fooled as far as I have seen, no one is really seeing him for
his true purpose. You may think that my words are too harsh to be coming from
his daughter but he revealed his true nature to me on the trip back from
Spokane the last time that he and I went together. He admitted to me that he
didn’t see me as a daughter but as a business investment that would eventually
turn a profit after he finished putting me through school.

[54]        
The plaintiffs submit that this letter confirms Harold’s intention to
trick his mother out of the farm. Carmen at trial said that she wrote the
letter following an argument with her father in an effort to make trouble
between him and her grandmother. She denied that her father intended to take
the farm from her grandmother. I do not accept Carmen’s characterization of the
letter. It appears to have been sincerely written at the time and, on her own
evidence, it was sent a few months after the argument she had with her father. Accepting,
then, that Harold had in the summer of 1988 an intention to move his mother
away from the farm for some reason, I do not accept it as evidence of the
exercise of undue influence in 1978, some 10 years earlier.

[55]        
I have considered carefully the testimony of the plaintiffs given at
trial. I have also considered the diary entries and other documents put into
evidence. I conclude that the plaintiffs sincerely hold the belief that Harold
unduly influenced their mother into leaving a life estate in Lot A to him with
a gift over to the defendant. However, their belief is based on surmise and
conjecture. The plaintiffs have not met the burden of proving, on a balance of
probabilities, that the will made by Ola May in 1978 was the product of undue
influence. Their sense that Harold had an opportunity to and exerted influence on
Ola May, causing her to make a will that was not fair to the rest of the
family, does not suffice.

CONCLUSION

[56]        
The plaintiffs’ claim is dismissed.

[57]        
Carmen Woods is entitled to her costs from the plaintiffs at Scale B.

[58]        
The administrator of the estate, Peter Moody, did not participate in the
proceedings before me. If there are issues with respect to his costs, they may
be spoken to within three months of the date of these reasons for judgment.

The Honourable Madam Justice L.A. Fenlon